LIPIcs by Avni, Guy et al.
Timed Network Games with Clocks
Guy Avni1
IST Austria, Klosterneuburg, Austria
guy.avni@ist.ac.at
Shibashis Guha2
Université Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium
shibashis.guha@ulb.ac.be
Orna Kupferman3
Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
orna@cs.huji.ac.il
Abstract
Network games are widely used as a model for selfish resource-allocation problems. In the classical
model, each player selects a path connecting her source and target vertices. The cost of traversing
an edge depends on the load; namely, number of players that traverse it. Thus, it abstracts the fact
that different users may use a resource at different times and for different durations, which plays
an important role in determining the costs of the users in reality. For example, when transmitting
packets in a communication network, routing traffic in a road network, or processing a task in a
production system, actual sharing and congestion of resources crucially depends on time.
In [13], we introduced timed network games, which add a time component to network games.
Each vertex v in the network is associated with a cost function, mapping the load on v to the
price that a player pays for staying in v for one time unit with this load. Each edge in the
network is guarded by the time intervals in which it can be traversed, which forces the players to
spend time in the vertices. In this work we significantly extend the way time can be referred to
in timed network games. In the model we study, the network is equipped with clocks, and, as in
timed automata, edges are guarded by constraints on the values of the clocks, and their traversal
may involve a reset of some clocks. We argue that the stronger model captures many realistic
networks. The addition of clocks breaks the techniques we developed in [13] and we develop
new techniques in order to show that positive results on classic network games carry over to the
stronger timed setting.
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1 Introduction
Network games (NGs, for short) [10, 48, 49] constitute a well studied model of non-cooperative
games. The game is played among selfish players on a network, which is a directed graph.
Each player has a source and a target vertex, and a strategy is a choice of a path that
connects these two vertices. The cost a player pays for an edge depends on the load on it,
namely the number of players that use the edge, and the total cost is the sum of costs of the
edges she uses. In cost-sharing games, load has a positive effect on cost: each edge has a
cost and the players that use it split the cost among them. Then, in congestion games4, load
has a negative effect on cost: each edge has a non-decreasing latency function that maps the
load on the edge to its cost.
One limitation of NGs is that the cost of using a resource abstracts the fact that different
users may use the resource at different times and for different durations. This is a real
limitation, as time plays an important role in many real-life settings. For example, in a road
or a communication system, congestion only affects cars or messages that use a road or a
channel simultaneously. We are interested in settings in which congestion affects the quality
of service (QoS) or the way a price is shared by entities using a resource at the same time
(rather than affecting the travel time). For example, discomfort increases in a crowded train
(in congestion games) or price is shared by the passengers in a taxi (in cost-sharing games).
The need to address temporal behaviors has attracted a lot of research in theoretical
computer science. Formalisms like temporal logic [46] enable the specification of the temporal
ordering of events. Its refinement to formalisms like real-time temporal logic [7], interval
temporal logic [42], and timed automata (TAs, for short) [6] enables the specification of
real-time behaviors. Extensions of TAs include priced timed automata (PTAs, for short) that
assign costs to real-time behaviors. Thus, PTAs are suitable for reasoning about quality of
real-time systems. They lack, however, the capability to reason about multi-agent systems in
which the players’ choices affect the incurred costs.
We study timed network games (TNGs, for short) – a new model that adds a time
component to NGs. A TNG is played on a timed-network in which edges are labeled by
guards that specify time restrictions on when the edge can be traversed. Similar to NGs,
each player has a source and target vertex, but a strategy is now a timed path that specifies,
in addition to which vertices are traversed, the amount of time that is spent in each vertex.
Players pay for staying in vertices, and the cost of staying in a vertex v in a time interval
I ⊆ IR≥0 is affected by the load in v during I. In [13], we studied a class of TNGs that
offered a first extension of NGs to a timed variant in which the reference to time is restricted:
the guards on the edges refer only to global time, i.e., the time that has elapsed since the
beginning of the game. In the model in [13], it is impossible to refer to the duration of certain
events that occur during the game, for example, it is not possible to express constraints that
require staying exactly one time unit in a vertex. Accordingly, we refer to that class as global
TNGs (GTNGs, for short).
In this work, we significantly extend the way time can be referred to in TNGs. We do this
by adding clocks that may be reset along the edges, and by allowing the guards on the edges
to refer to the values of all clocks. GTNGs can be viewed as a fragment in which there is
only a single clock that is never reset. We demonstrate our model in the following example.
4 The name congestion games is sometimes used to refer to games with general latency functions. We
find it more appropriate to use it to refer to games with non-decreasing functions.
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u1 v1 s v2 u2
1 ≤ x ≤ 2∧
3 ≤ y ≤ 4, {x}
1 ≤ x ≤ 2, {x} 1 ≤ x ≤ 2, {x} 1 ≤ x ≤ 2∧
4 ≤ y ≤ 5, {x}
1 ≤ x ≤ 2, {x}
Figure 1 A congestion TNG.
I Example 1. Consider a setting in which messages are sent through a network of routers.
Messages are owned by selfish agents who try to avoid congested routes, where there is a
greater chance of loss or corruption. The owners of the messages decide how much time
they spend in each router. Using TNGs, we can model constraints on these times, as well as
constraints on global events, in particular, arrival time. Note that in some applications, c.f.,
advertising or security, messages need to patrol the network with a lower bound on their
arrival time.
Consider the TNG appearing in Figure 1. The vertices in the TNG model the routers.
There are two players that model two agents, each sending a message. The source of both
messages is s and the targets are u1 and u2, for messages 1 and 2, respectively. The latency
functions are described in the vertices, as a function of the load m; e.g., the latency function
in v2 is `v2(m) = 3m. Thus, when a single message stays in v2 the cost for each time unit is
3, and when the two messages visit v2 simultaneously, the cost for each of them is 6 per unit
time. The network has two clocks, x and y. Clock x is reset in each transition and thus is
used to impose restrictions on the time that can be spent in each router: since all transitions
can be taken when 1 ≤ x ≤ 2, a message stays between 1 and 2 time units in a router. Clock
y is never reset, thus it keeps track of the global time. The guards on clock y guarantee that
message 1 reaches its destination by time 4 but not before time 3 and message 2 reaches its
destination by time 5 but not before time 4.
Suppose the first agent chooses the timed path (s, 2), (v1, 1), u1, thus message 1 stays in
s for two time units and in v1 for one time unit before reaching its destination u1. Suppose
the second agent chooses the path (s, 2), (v1, 2), (v2, 1), u2. Note that crossing an edge is
instantaneous. Since both messages stay in the same vertices during the intervals I1 = [0, 2]
and I2 = [2, 3], the load in the corresponding vertices is 2. During interval I1, each of the
agents pays |I1| · `s(2) = 2 · 4 and during I2, each pays |I2| · `v1(2) = 1 · 2. Message 2 stays in
v1 alone during the interval [3, 4] and in v2 during the interval [4, 5], for which it pays 1 and
3, respectively. The total costs are thus 10 and 14.
Before we elaborate on our contribution, let us survey relevant works, namely, extensions
of NGs with temporal aspects and extensions of timed-automata to games. Extensions of
NGs that involve reasoning about time mostly study a cost model in which the players try to
minimize the time of arrival at their destinations (c.f., [36, 39, 47, 45]), where, for example,
congestion affects the duration of crossing an edge. These works are different from ours since
we consider a QoS cost model. An exception is [36], which studies the QoS costs. A key
difference in the models is that there, time is discrete and the players have finitely many
strategies. Thus, reductions to classical resource allocation games is straightforward while for
TNGs it is not possible, as we elaborate below. Games on timed automata were first studied
in [11] in which an algorithm to solve timed games with timed reachability objective was
given. The work was later generalized and improved [4, 20, 35, 23]. Average timed games,
games with parity objectives, mean-payoff games and energy games have also been studied in
the context of timed automata [2, 37, 27, 21, 34]. All the timed games above are two-player
zero-sum ongoing games. Prices are fixed and there is no notion of load. Also, the questions
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studied on these games concern their decidability, namely finding winners and strategies
for them. TNGs are not zero-sum games, so winning strategies do not exist. Instead, the
problems we study here concern rationality and stability.
The first question that arises in the context of non-zero-sum games is the existence of
stable outcomes. In the context of NGs, the most prominent stability concept is that of a
(pure) Nash equilibrium (NE, for short) [43] – a profile such that no player can decrease her
cost by unilaterally deviating from her current strategy.5 Decentralized decision-making may
lead to solutions that are sub-optimal for the society as a whole. The standard measures
to quantify the inefficiency incurred due to selfish behavior is the price of stability (PoS)
[10] and the price of anarchy (PoA) [38]. In both measures we compare against the social
optimum (SO, for short), namely a profile that minimizes the sum of costs of all players. The
PoS (PoA, respectively) is the best-case (worst-case) inefficiency of an NE; that is, the ratio
between the cost of a best (worst) NE and the SO.
The picture of stability and equilibrium inefficiency for standard NGs is well understood.
Every NG has an NE, and in fact these games are potential games [48], which have the
following stronger property: a best response sequence is a sequence of profiles P1, P2, . . .
such that, for i ≥ 1, the profile Pi+1 is obtained from Pi by letting some player deviate and
decrease her personal cost. In finite potential games, every best-response sequence converges
to an NE. For k-player cost-sharing NGs, the PoS and PoA are log k and k, respectively [10].
For congestion games with affine cost functions, PoS ≈ 1.577 [29, 1] and PoA = 52 [30].
In [13], we showed that these positive results carry over to GTNGs. A key technical
feature of GTNGs is that since guards refer to global time, it is easy to find an upper bound
T on the time by which all players reach their destinations. Proving existence of NE follows
from a reduction to NGs, using a zone-like structure [5, 18]. The introduction of clocks
with resets breaks the direct reduction to NGs and questions the existence of a bound by
which the players arrive at their destinations.6 To see the difficulty in finding such a bound,
consider, for example, a cost-sharing game in which all players, on their paths to their targets,
need to stay for one time unit in a “gateway” vertex v that costs 1 (see details in Section 6).
Assume also that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Player i can only reach v in times that are multiples of pi,
for relatively prime numbers p1, . . . , pk. The SO is obtained when all players synchronize
their visits to v, and such a synchronization forces them to wait till time p1 · . . . · pk, which is
exponential in the TNG.
The lack of an upper bound on the global time in TNGs demonstrates that we need a
different approach to obtain positive results for general TNGs. We show that TNGs are
guaranteed to have an NE. Our proof uses a combination of techniques from real-time models
and resource allocation games. Recall that a PTA assigns a price to a timed word. We are
able to reduce the best-response and the social-optimum problems to and from the problem of
finding cheapest runs in PTAs [19], showing that the problems are PSPACE-complete. Next,
we show that TNGs are potential games. Note that since players have uncountably many
strategies, the fact that TNGs are potential games does not immediately imply existence of
an NE, as a best-response sequence may not be finite. We show that there is a best-response
sequence that terminates in an NE. For this, we first need to show the existence of an integral
best-response, which is obtained from the reduction to PTAs. Finally, given a TNG, we find
a time T such that there exists an NE in which all players reach their destination by time T .
Due to lack of space, some of the proofs appear in the full version [14].
5 Throughout this paper, we consider pure strategies, as is the case for the vast literature on NGs.
6 In the full version we show that even with an upper bound on time, a reduction from TNGs to NGs is
not likely.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Resource allocation games and network games
For k ∈ N, let [k] = {1, . . . , k}. A resource allocation game (RAG, for short) is R =
〈k,E, {Σi}i∈[k], {`e}e∈E〉, where k ∈ N is the number of players; E is a set of resources;
for i ∈ [k], the set strategies of Player i is Σi ⊆ 2E ; and, for e ∈ E, the latency function
`e : [k]→ Q≥0 maps a load on e to its cost under this load. A profile is a choice of a strategy
for each player. The set of profiles of R is profiles(R) = Σ1×. . .×Σk. For e ∈ E, we define the
load on e in a profile P = 〈σ1, . . . , σk〉, denoted loadP (e), as the number of players using e in
P , thus loadP (e) = |{i ∈ [k] : e ∈ σi}|. The cost a player pays in profile P , denoted costi(P ),
depends on the choices of the other players. We define costi(P ) =
∑
e∈σi `e(loadP (e)).
Network games (NGs, for short) can be viewed as a special case of RAGs where
strategies are succinctly represented by means of paths in graphs. An NG is N = 〈k, V , E,
{〈si, ui〉}i∈[k], {`e}e∈E〉, where 〈V,E〉 is a directed graph; for i ∈ [k], the vertices si and ui
are the source and target vertices of Player i; and the latency functions are as in RAGs. The
set of strategies for Player i is the set of simple paths from si to ui in N . Thus, in NGs, the
resources are the edges in the graph.
We distinguish between two types of latency functions. In cost-sharing games, the players
that visit a vertex share its cost equally. Formally, every e ∈ E has a cost ce ∈ Q≥0 and its
latency function is `e(l) = cel . Note that these latency functions are decreasing, thus the
load has a positive effect on the cost. In contrast, in congestion games, the cost functions
are non-decreasing and so the load has a negative effect on the cost. Typically, the latency
functions are restricted to simple functions such as linear latency functions, polynomials, and
so forth.
2.2 Timed networks and timed network games
A clock is a variable that gets values from IR≥0 and whose value increases as time elapses.
A reset of a clock x assigns value 0 to x. A guard over a set C of clocks is a conjunction
of clock constraints of the form x ∼ m, for x ∈ C, ∼∈ {≤,=,≥}, and m ∈ N. Note that
we disallow guards that use the operators < and > (see Remark 4). A guard of the form∧
x∈C x ≥ 0 is called true. The set of guards over C is denoted Φ(C). A clock valuation is
an assignment κ : C → IR≥0. A clock valuation κ satisfies a guard g, denoted κ |= g, if the
expression obtained from g by replacing each clock x ∈ C with the value κ(x) is valid.
A timed network is a tuple A = 〈C, V,E〉, where C is a set of clocks, V is a set of vertices,
and E ⊆ V × Φ(C)× 2C × V is a set of directed edges in which each edge e is associated
with a guard g ∈ Φ(C) that should be satisfied when e is traversed and a set R ⊆ C of clocks
that are reset along the traversal of e.
When traversing a path in a timed network, time is spent in vertices, and edges are
traversed instantaneously. Accordingly, a timed path in A is a sequence η = 〈τ1, e1〉, . . . ,
〈τn, en〉 ∈ (IR≥0 × E)∗, describing edges that the path traverses along with their traversal
times. The timed path η is legal if the edges are successive and the guards associated with
them are satisfied. Formally, there is a sequence 〈v0, t0〉, . . . , 〈vn−1, tn−1〉, vn ∈ (V ×IR≥0)∗ ·V ,
describing the vertices that η visits and the time spent in these vertices, such that for every
1 ≤ j ≤ n, the following hold: (1) tj−1 = τj − τj−1, with τ0 = 0, (2) there is gj ∈ Φ(C) and
Rj ⊆ C, such that ej = 〈vj−1, gj , Rj , vj〉, (3) there is a clock valuation κj that describes the
values of the clocks before the incoming edge to vertex vj is traversed. Thus, κ1(x) = t0,
for all x ∈ C, and for 1 < j ≤ n, we distinguish between clocks that are reset when ej−1
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is traversed and clocks that are not reset: for x ∈ Rj−1, we define κj(x) = tj−1, and for
x ∈ (C \Rj−1), we define κj(x) = κj−1(x) + tj−1, and (4) for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have that
κj |= gj . We sometimes refer to η also as the sequence 〈v0, t0〉, . . . , 〈vn−1, tn−1〉, vn.
Consider a finite set T ⊆ IR≥0 of time points. We say that a timed path η is a T -path if
all edges in η are taken at times in T . Formally, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have that τj ∈ T . We
refer to the time at which η ends as the time τn at which the destination is reached. We say
that η is integral if T ⊆ N.
A timed network game (TNG, for short) extends an NG by imposing constraints on the
times at which edges may be traversed. Formally, T = 〈k,C, V,E, {`v}v∈V , 〈si, ui〉i∈[k]〉
includes a set C of clocks, and 〈C, V,E〉 is a timed network. Recall that while traversing a
path in a timed network, time is spent in vertices. Accordingly, the latency functions now
apply to vertices, thus `v : [k] → Q≥0 maps a load on vertex v to its cost under this load.
Traversing an edge is instantaneous and is free of charge. A strategy for Player i, for i ∈ [k],
is then a legal timed path from si to ui. We assume all players have at least one strategy.
I Remark. A possible extension of TNGs is to allow costs on edges. Since edges are traversed
instantaneously, these costs would not be affected by load. Such an extension does not affect
our results and we leave it out for sake of simplicity. Another possible extension is allowing
strict time guards, which we discuss in Remark 4.
The cost Player i pays in profile P , denoted costi(P ), depends on the vertices in her
timed path, the time spent on them, and the load during the visits. In order to define the
cost formally, we need some definitions. For a finite set T ⊆ IR≥0 of time points, we say that
a timed path is a T -strategy if it is a T -path. Then, a profile P is a T -profile if it consists
only of T -strategies. Let tmax = max(T ). For t ∈ T such that t < tmax, let nextT (t) be the
minimal time point in T that is strictly larger than t. We partition the interval [0, tmax] into
a set Υ of sub-intervals [m,nextT (m)] for every m ∈ (T ∪ {0}) \ {tmax}. We refer to the
sub-intervals in Υ as periods. Suppose T is the minimal set such that P is a T -profile. Note
that Υ is the coarsest partition of [0, tmax] into periods such that no player crosses an edge
within a period in Υ. We denote this partition by ΥP .
For a player i ∈ [k] and a period γ ∈ ΥP , let visitsP (i, γ) be the vertex that Player i
visits during period γ. That is, if pii = 〈vi0, ti0〉, . . . , 〈vini−1, tini−1〉, vini is a legal timed path
that is a strategy for Player i and γ = [m1,m2], then visitsP (i, γ) is the vertex vij for the
index 1 ≤ j < ni such that τ ij ≤ m1 ≤ m2 ≤ τ ij+1, and visitsP (i, γ) is the vertex vi0 if
0 = m1 ≤ m2 ≤ τ i1. Note that since P is a T -profile, for each period γ ∈ ΥP , the number
of players that stay in each vertex v during γ is fixed. Let loadP (v, γ) denote this number.
Formally loadP (v, γ) = |{i : visitsP (i, γ) = v}|. Finally, for a period γ = [m1,m2], let
|γ| = m2 −m1 be the duration of γ. Suppose Player i’s path ends at time τ i. Let ΥiP ⊆ ΥP
denote the periods that end by time τi.
Recall that the latency function `v : [k] −→ Q≥0 maps the number of players that simul-
taneously visit vertex v to the price that each of them pays per time unit. If visitsP (i, γ) = v,
then the cost of Player i in P , over the period γ is costγ,i(P ) = `v(loadP (v, γ)) · |γ|. We
define costi(P ) =
∑
γ∈Υi
P
costγ,i(P ). The cost of the profile P , denoted cost(P ), is the total
cost incurred by all the players, i.e., cost(P ) =
∑k
i=1 costi(P ).
A T -strategy is called an integral strategy when T ⊆ N, and similarly for integral profile.
A profile P = 〈pi1, . . . , pik〉 is said to end by time τ if for each i ∈ [k], the strategy pii ends
by time τ . Consider a TNG T that has a cycle such that a clock x of T is reset on the cycle.
It is not difficult to see that this may lead to T having infinitely many integral profiles that
end by different times. A TNG T is called global if it has a single clock x that is never reset.
We use GTNG to indicate that a TNG is global.
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As in RAGs, we distinguish between cost-sharing TNGs that have cost-sharing latency
functions and congestion TNGs in which the latency functions are non-decreasing.
2.3 Stability and efficiency
Consider a game G. For a profile P and a strategy pi of player i ∈ [k], let P [i← pi] denote
the profile obtained from P by replacing the strategy of Player i in P by pi. A profile P is
said to be a (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE) if none of the players in [k] can benefit from a
unilateral deviation from her strategy in P to another strategy. Formally, for every Player i
and every strategy pi for Player i, it holds that costi(P [i← pi]) ≥ costi(P ).
A social optimum (SO) of a game G is a profile that attains the infimum cost over all
profiles. We denote by SO(G) the cost of an SO profile; i.e., SO(G) = infP∈profiles(G) cost(P ).
It is well known that decentralized decision-making may lead to sub-optimal solutions from
the point of view of the society as a whole. We quantify the inefficiency incurred due to
self-interested behavior by the price of anarchy (PoA) [38, 44] and price of stability (PoS)
[10] measures. The PoA is the worst-case inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium, while the PoS
measures the best-case inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium. Note that unlike resource allocation
games in which the set of profiles is finite, in TNGs there can be uncountably many NEs,
so both PoS and PoA need to be defined using infimum/supremum rather than min/max.
Formally,
I Definition 2. Let G be a family of games, and let G ∈ G be a game in G. Let Γ(G) be the
set of Nash equilibria of the game G. Assume that Γ(G) 6= ∅.
The price of anarchy of G is PoA(G) = supP∈Γ(G) cost(P )/SO(G). The price of anarchy
of the family of games G is PoA(G) = supG∈GPoA(G).
The price of stability of G is PoS(G) = infP∈Γ(G) cost(P )/SO(G). The price of stability
of the family of games G is PoS(G) = supG∈GPoS(G).
3 The Best-Response and the Social-Optimum Problems
Consider a TNG T = 〈k,C, V,E, {`v}v∈V , 〈si, ui〉i∈[k]〉. In the best-response problem (BR
problem, for short), we ask how a player reacts to a choice of strategies of the other players.
Formally, let pi1, . . . , pik−1 be a choice of integral7 strategies for Players 1, . . . , k− 1 in T . We
look for a strategy pik that minimizes costk(〈pi1, . . . , pik〉). The choice of allowing Player k to
react is arbitrary and is done for convenience of notation. In the social optimum problem
(SOPT problem, for short), we seek a profile that maximizes the social welfare, or in other
words, minimizes the sum of players’ costs.
In this section we describe priced timed automata (PTAs, for short) [9, 17] and show that
while they are different from TNGs both in terms of the model and the questions asked on
it, they offer a useful framework for reasoning about TNGs. In particular, we solve the BR
and SOPT problems by reductions to problems about PTAs.
3.1 From TNGs to priced timed automata
A PTA [9, 17] is P = 〈C, V,E, {rv}v∈V 〉, where 〈C, V,E〉 is a timed network and rv ∈ Q≥0
is the rate of vertex v ∈ V . Intuitively, the rate rv specifies the cost of staying in v for a
duration of one time unit. Thus, a timed path η = 〈v0, t0〉, . . . , 〈vn, tn〉, vn+1 in a PTA has a
7 We choose integral strategies since strategies with irrational times cannot be represented as part of
the input; for strategies that use rational times, the best response problem can be solved with little
modification in the proof of Theorem 4.
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price, denoted price(η), which is
∑
0≤j≤n rv · tv. The size of P is |V |+ |E| plus the number
of bits needed in the binary encoding of the numbers appearing in guards and rates in P. 8
Consider a PTA P and two vertices s and u. Let paths(s, u) be the set of timed paths
from s to u. We are interested in cheapest timed paths in paths(s, u). A priori, there
is no reason to assume that the minimal price is attained, thus we are interested in the
optimal price, denoted opt(s, u), which we define to be inf{price(η) : η ∈ paths(s, u)}. The
corresponding decision problem, called the cost optimal reachability problem (COR, for short)
takes in addition a threshold µ, and the goal is to decide whether opt(s, t) ≤ µ. Recall that
we do not allow the guards to use the operators < and >.
I Theorem 3. [19, 32] The COR problem is PSPACE-complete for PTAs with two or more
clocks. Moreover, the optimal price is attained by an integral path, i.e., there is an integral
path η ∈ paths(s, u) with price(η) = opt(s, u).
In Sections 3.2 and 3.3 below, we reduce problems on TNGs to problems on PTAs. The
reductions allow us to obtain properties on strategies and profiles in TNGs using results on
PTAs, which we later use in combination with techniques for NGs in order to solve problems
on TNGs.
3.2 The best-response problem
I Theorem 4. Consider a TNG T with n clocks and integral strategies pi1, . . . , pik−1 for
Players 1, . . . , k − 1. There is a PTA P with n+ 1 clocks and two vertices v and u such that
there is a one-to-one cost-preserving correspondence between strategies for Player k in T and
timed paths from v to u: for every strategy pik in T and its corresponding path η in P, we
have costk(〈pi1, . . . , pik〉) = price(η).
Proof. We describe the intuition of the reduction and the details can be found in the full
version. Consider a TNG T = 〈k, V,E,C, {`v}v∈V , 〈si, ui〉i∈[k]〉, where C = {x1, . . . , xm}.
Let Q = 〈pi1, . . . , pik−1〉 be a choice of timed paths for Players 1, . . . , k − 1. Note that Q can
be seen as a profile in a game that is obtained from T by removing Player k, and we use
the definitions for profiles on Q in the expected manner. Let T ⊆ Q be the minimal set of
time points for which all the strategies in Q are T -strategies. Consider two consecutive time
points a, b ∈ T , i.e., there is no c ∈ T with a < c < b. Then, there are players that cross
edges at times a and b, and no player crosses an edge at time points in the interval (a, b).
Moreover, let tmax be the latest time in T , then tmax is the latest time at which a player
reaches her destination. Let ΥQ be a partition of [0, tmax] according to T . We obtain Υ′Q
from ΥQ by adding the interval [tmax,∞).
A key observation is that the load on all the vertices is unchanged during every interval
in Υ′Q. For a vertex v ∈ V and δ ∈ ΥQ, the cost Player k pays per unit time for using v in
the interval δ is `v(loadQ(v, δ) + 1). On the other hand, since all k − 1 players reach their
destination by time tmax, the load on v after tmax is 0, and the cost Player k pays for using
it then is `v(1).
The PTA P that we construct has |Υ′Q| copies of T , thus its vertices are V ×Υ′Q. Let
δ0 = [0, b] ∈ Υ′Q be the first interval. We consider paths from the vertex v = 〈sk, δ0〉,
which is the copy of Player k’s source in the first copy of T , to a target u, which is a new
vertex we add and whose only incoming edges are from vertices of the form 〈uk, δ〉, namely,
8 In general, PTAs have rates on transitions and strict time guards, which we do not need here.
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the copies of the target vertex uk of Player k. We construct P such that each such path
η from v to u in P corresponds to a legal strategy pik for Player k in T , and such that
costk(〈pi1, . . . , pik−1, pik〉) = price(η). The main difference between the copies are the vertices’
costs, which depend on the load as in the above. We refer to the n clocks in T as local clocks.
In each copy of P , we use the local clocks and their guards in T as well as an additional global
clock that is never reset to keep track of global time. Let δ = [a, b] ∈ ΥQ and δ′ = [b, c] ∈ Υ′Q
be the following interval. Let Tδ and Tδ′ be the copies of T that corresponds to the respective
intervals. The local clocks guarantee that a path in Tδ is a legal path in T . The global
clock allows us to make sure that (1) proceeding from Tδ to Tδ′ can only occur precisely at
time b, and (2) proceeding from 〈uk, δ〉 in Tδ to the target u can only occur at a time in the
interval δ. J
We conclude with the computational complexity of the BR problem. The decision-
problem variant gets as input a TNG T , integral strategies pi1, . . . , pik−1 for Players 1, . . .,
k − 1, and a value µ, and the goal is to decide whether Player k has a strategy pik such that
costk(〈pi1, . . . , pik〉) ≤ µ. Theorem 4 implies a reduction from the BR problem to the COR
problem and a reduction in the other direction is easy since PTAs can be seen as TNGs
with a single player. For one-clock instances, we show that the BR problem is NP-hard
by a reduction from the subset-sum problem. Note the contrast with the COR problem
in one-clock instances, which is NLOGSPACE-complete [41]. The proof of the following
theorem can be found in the full version.
I Theorem 5. The BR problem is PSPACE-complete for TNGs with two or more clocks.
For one-clock cost-sharing and congestion TNGs it is in PSPACE and NP-hard.
Proof. We reduce the BR problem to and from the COR problem, which is PSPACE-complete
for PTAs with at least two clocks [19]. A PTA can be seen as a one-player TNG, thus the
BR problem for TNGs with two or more clocks is PSPACE-hard. For the upper bound,
given a TNG T , strategies Q = 〈pi1, . . . , pik−1〉 for Players 1, . . . , k − 1, and a threshold µ,
we construct a PTA P as in the proof of Theorem 4. Note that the size of P is polynomial
in the size of the input and that P has one more clock than T . An optimal path in P is a
best response for Player k, and such a path can be found in PSPACE.
The final case to consider is TNGs with one clock. We show that the BR problem is
NP-hard for such instances using a reduction from the subset-sum problem. The input to
that problem is a set of natural numbers A = {a1, . . . , an} and µ ∈ N, and the goal is to
decide whether there is a subset of A whose sum is µ. We start with the cost-sharing case.
The game we construct is a two-player game on a network that is depicted in Figure 2.
Player 2 has a unique strategy that visits vertex vn+1 in the time interval [µ, µ + 1]. A
Player 1 strategy pi corresponds to a choice of a subset of A. Player 1’s source is v1 and her
target is u2. The vertex vn+1 is the only vertex that has a cost, which is 1, and the other
vertices cost 0. For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Player 1 needs to choose between staying in vertex vi for a
duration of ai time units, and exiting the vertex through the top edge, or staying 0 time
units, and exiting the vertex through the bottom edge. Finally, she must stay in vn+1 for
exactly one time unit. The cost Player 1 pays for vn+1 depends on the load. If she stays
there in the global time interval [µ, µ+ 1], she pays 1/2, and otherwise she pays 1. Thus,
Player 1 has a strategy with which she pays 1/2 iff there is a subset of A whose sum is µ,
and we are done.
The reduction for congestion games is similar. Recall that in congestion games, the cost
increases with the load, thus a player would aim at using a vertex together with as few
other players as possible. The network is the same as the one used above. Instead of two
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Figure 2 NP-hardness proof of best response problem in one clock TNG.
players, we use three players, where Players 2 and 3 have a unique strategy each. Player 2
must stay in vn+1 in the time interval [0, µ] and Player 3 must stay there during the interval
[µ+ 1,
∑
1≤i≤n ai]. As in the above, Player 1 has a strategy in which she uses vn+1 alone in
the time interval [µ, µ+ 1] iff there is a subset of A whose sum is µ. J
3.3 The social-optimum problem
I Theorem 6. Consider a TNG T = 〈k,C, V,E, {`v}v∈V , 〈si, ui〉i∈[k]〉. There is a PTA P
with k · |C| clocks, |V |k vertices, and two vertices s¯ and u¯ such that there is a one-to-one
cost-preserving correspondence between profiles in T and paths from s¯ to u¯; namely, for a
profile P and its corresponding path ηP , we have cost(P ) = price(ηP ).
Proof. We describe the intuition of the construction and the details can be found in the
full version. Recall that the social optimum is obtained when the players do not act
selfishly, rather they cooperate to find the profile that minimizes their sum of costs. Let
T = 〈k,C, V,E, {`v}v∈V , 〈si, ui〉i∈[k]〉. We construct a PTA P by taking k copies of T . For
i ∈ [k], the i-th copy is used to keep track of the timed path that Player i uses. We need k
copies of the clocks of T to guarantee that the individual paths are legal. Recall that the
players’ goal is to minimize their total cost, thus for each point in time, the price they pay in
P is the sum of their individual costs in T . More formally, consider a vertex v¯ = 〈v1, . . . , vk〉
in P and let Sv¯ ⊆ V be the set of vertices that appear in v¯. Then, the load on a vertex
v ∈ Sv¯ in v¯ is loadv¯(v) = |{i : vi = v}|, and the rate of v¯ is
∑
v∈Sv¯ `v(loadv¯(v)). The cost
of the social optimum in T coincides with the price of the optimal timed path in P from
〈s1, . . . , sk〉 to the vertex 〈u1, . . . , uk〉, i.e., the vertices that respectively correspond to the
sources and targets of all players. J
We turn to study the complexity of the SOPT problem. In the decision-problem variant,
we are given a TNG T and a value µ and the goal is to decide whether there is a profile P in
T with cost(P ) ≤ µ. Theorem 6 implies a reduction from the SOPT problem to the COR
problem, and, as in the BR problem, the other direction is trivial. For one-clock instances,
we use the same NP-hardness proof as in the BR problem. The details can be found in the
full version.
I Theorem 7. The SOPT problem is PSPACE-complete for at least two clocks and it is
NP-hard for TNGs with one clock.
4 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium
The first question that arises in the context of games is the existence of an NE. In [13], we
showed that GTNGs are guaranteed to have an NE by reducing every GTNG to an NG. We
strengthen the result by showing that every TNG has an NE.
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In order to prove existence, we combine techniques from NGs and use the reduction to
PTA in Theorem 4. A standard method for finding an NE is showing that a best-response
sequence converges: Starting from some profile P = 〈pi1, . . . , pik〉, one searches for a player that
can benefit from a unilateral deviation. If no such player exists, then P is an NE and we are
done. Otherwise, let pi′i be a beneficial deviation for Player i, i.e., costi(P ) > costi(P [i← pi′i]).
The profile P [i← pi′i] is considered next and the above procedure repeats.
A potential function for a game is a function Ψ that maps profiles to costs, such that the
following holds: for every profile P = 〈pi1, . . . , pik〉, i ∈ [k], and strategy pi′i for Player i, we
have Ψ(P )−Ψ(P [i← pi′i]) = costi(P )− costi(P [i← pi′i]), i.e., the change in potential equals
the change in cost of the deviating player. A game is a potential game if it has a potential
function. In a potential game with finitely many profiles, since the potential of every profile
is non-negative and in every step of a best-response sequence the potential strictly decreases,
every best-response sequence terminates in an NE. It is well-known that RAGs are potential
games [48] and since they are finite, this implies that an NE always exists.
The idea of our proof is as follows. First, we show that TNGs are potential games, which
does not imply existence of NE since TNGs have infinitely many profiles. Then, we focus on
a specific best-response sequence that starts from an integral profile and allows the players
to deviate only to integral strategies. Finally, we define normalized TNGs and show how to
normalize a TNG in a way that preserves existence of NE. For normalized TNGs, we show
that the potential reduces at least by 1 along each step in the best-response sequence, thus it
converges to an NE.
I Theorem 8. TNGs are potential games.
Proof. Consider a TNG T = 〈k,C, V,E, {`v}v∈V , 〈si, ui〉i∈[k]〉. Recall that for a profile P ,
the set of intervals that are used in P is ΥP . We define a potential function Ψ that is an
adaptation of Rosenthal’s potential function [48] to TNGs. We decompose the definition of Ψ
into smaller components, which will be helpful later on. For every γ ∈ ΥP and v ∈ V , we define
Ψγ,v(P ) =
∑loadP (v,γ)
j=1 |γ| · `v(j), that is, we take the sum of |γ| · `v(j) for all j ∈ [loadP (v, γ)].
We define Ψγ(P ) =
∑
v∈V Ψγ,v(P ), and we define Ψ(P ) =
∑
γ∈ΥP Ψγ(P ). Let for some
i ∈ [k], we have P ′ to be a profile that is obtained by an unilateral deviation of Player i to a
strictly beneficial strategy pi′i from her current strategy in P , that is P ′ = P [i← pi′] for some
i ∈ [k]. In the full version, we show that Ψ(P )−Ψ(P ′) = costi(P )− costi(P ′). J
Recall from Theorem 4, that given a TNG, a profile P and an index i, we find the best
response of Player i by constructing a PTA. If P is an integral profile, from Theorem 3, we
have that the best response of Player i also leads to an integer profile. Thus we have the
following lemma.
I Lemma 9. Consider a TNG T and an integral profile P . For i ∈ [k], if Player i has a
beneficial deviation from P , then she has an integral beneficial deviation.
The last ingredient of the proof gives a lower bound for the difference in cost that is
achieved in a beneficial integral deviation for some player i ∈ [k], which in turn bounds the
change in potential.
We first need to introduce a normalized form of TNGs. Recall that the latency function in
a TNG T is of the form `v : [k]→ Q≥0. In a normalized TNG all the latency functions map
loads to natural numbers, thus for every vertex v ∈ V , we have `v : [k]→ N. Constructing a
normalized TNG from a TNG is easy. Let L be the least common multiple of the denominators
of the elements in the set {`v(l) : v ∈ V and l ∈ [k]}. For every latency function `v and every
l ∈ [k] , we construct a new latency function `′v by `′v(l) = `v(l) · L.
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Consider a TNG T and let T ′ be the normalized TNG that is constructed from T . It is
not hard to see that for every profile P and i ∈ [k], we have costi(P ) in T ′ is L ·costi(P ) in T .
We can thus restrict attention to normalized TNGs as the existence of NE and convergence
of best-response sequence in T ′ implies the same properties in T . In order to show that
a best-response sequence converges in TNGs, we bound the change of potential in each
best-response step by observing that in normalized TNGs, the cost a player pays is an integer.
I Lemma 10. Let T be a normalized TNG, P = 〈pi1, . . . , pik〉 be an integral profile in T , and
pi′i be a beneficial integral deviation for Player i, for some i ∈ [k]. Then, costi(P )−costi(P [i←
pi′i]) ≥ 1.
We can now prove the main result in this section.
I Theorem 11. Every TNG has an integral NE. Moreover, from an integral profile P , there
is a best-response sequence that converges to an integral NE.
Proof. Lemma 9 allows us to restrict attention to integral deviations. Indeed, consider an
integral profile P . Lemma 9 implies that if no player has a beneficial integral deviation from
P , then P is an NE in T . We start best-response sequence from some integral profile PI
and allow the players to deviate with integral strategies only. Consider a profile P and let
P ′ be a profile that is obtained from P by a deviation of Player i. Recall from Theorem 8
that costi(P ) − costi(P ′) = Ψ(P ) −Ψ(P ′). Lemma 10 implies that when the deviation is
beneficial, we have Ψ(P )−Ψ(P ′) ≥ 1. Since the potential is non-negative, the best-response
sequence above converges within Ψ(PI) steps. J
I Remark. A TNG that allows < and > operators on the guards is not guaranteed to have
an NE. Indeed, in a PTA, which can be seen as a one-player TNG, strict guards imply that
an optimal timed path may not be achieved. In turn, this means that an NE does not exist.
To overcome this issue, we use -NE, for  > 0; an -deviation is one that improves the payoff
of a player at least by , and an -NE is a profile in which no player has a -deviation. Our
techniques can be adapted to show that -NE exist in TNGs with strict guards. The proof
uses the results of [19] that show that an -optimal timed path exists in PTAs. The proof
technique for existence of NE in TNGs with non-strict guards can then be adapted to the
strict-guard case.
5 Equilibrium Inefficiency
In this section we address the problem of measuring the degradation in social welfare due
to selfish behavior, which is measured by the PoS and PoA measures. We show that the
upper bounds from RAGs on these two measures apply to TNGs. For cost-sharing TNGs,
we show that the PoS and PoA are at most log k and k, respectively, as it is in cost-sharing
RAGs. Matching lower bounds were given in [13] already for GTNGs. For congestion TNGs
with affine latency functions, we show that the PoS and PoA are 1 +
√
(3)/3 ≈ 1.577 and 52 ,
respectively, as it is in congestion RAGs. Again, a matching lower bound for PoA is shown
in [13] for GTNGs, and a matching lower bound for the PoS remains open. Let F denote a
family of latency functions and F-TNGs and F-RAGs denote, respectively, the family of
TNGs and RAGs that use latency functions from this family.
I Theorem 12. Consider a family of latency functions F . We have PoS(F-TNGs) ≤
PoS(F-RAGs) and PoA(F-TNGs) ≤ PoA(F-RAGs). In particular, the PoS and PoA for
cost-sharing TNGs with k players is at most log(k) and k, respectively, and for congestion
TNGs with affine latency functions it is at most roughly 1.577 and 52 respectively.
G. Avni, S. Guha, and O. Kupferman 23:13
Proof. We prove for PoS in cost-sharing games and the other proofs are similar. Consider
a TNG T and let N1, N2, . . . be a sequence of NEs whose cost tends to c∗ = infP∈Γ(T ) cost(P ).
Let O be a social optimum profile in T , which exists due to Theorem 6. Thus, PoS(T ) =
limj→∞ cost(N j)/ cost(O). We show that each element in the sequence is bounded above
by PoS(cost-sharing RAGs), which implies that PoS(T ) ≤ PoS(cost-sharing RAGs), and
hence PoS(cost-sharing TNGs) ≤ PoS(cost-sharing RAGs). In the full version, for each
j ≥ 1, we construct a RAG Rj that has PoS(Rj) = cost(N j)/cost(O), and since Rj is a
cost-sharing RAG, we have PoS(Rj) ≤ PoS(cost- sharing RAGs), and we are done. J
6 Time Bounds
Recall that due to resets of clocks, the time by which a profile ends can be potentially
unbounded. It is interesting to know, given a TNG, whether there are time bounds within
which some interesting profiles like an NE and an SO are guaranteed to exist. Earlier we
showed that every TNG is guaranteed to have an integral NE (Theorem 11) and an integral
SO (Theorem 6). In this section we give bounds on the time by which such profiles end.
That is, given a TNG T , we find tNE(T ), TSO(T ) ∈ Q≥0 such that an integral NE N and
an integral SO O exist in T in which the players reach their destinations by time tNE(T )
and TSO(T ) respectively.
We start by showing a time bound on an optimal timed path in a PTA, and then proceed
to TNGs.
I Lemma 13. Consider a PTA P = 〈C, V,E, {rv}v∈V 〉, and let χ be the largest constant
appearing in the guards on the edges of P. Then, for every s, u ∈ V , there is an integral
optimal timed path from s to u that ends by time |V | · (χ+ 2)|C|.
Proof. Consider an optimal integral timed path η in P that ends in the earliest time and
includes no loop that is traversed instantaneously. Let v0, . . . , vn be the sequence of vertices
that η traverses, and, for 0 ≤ i < n, let κi be the clock valuation before exiting the vertex vi.
Since η is integral, κi assigns integral values to clocks. Note that since the largest constant
appearing in a guard in P is χ, the guards in P cannot differentiate between clock values
greater than χ. We abstract away such values and define the restriction of a clock valuation
κi to be βi : C → ({0} ∪ [χ] ∪ {>}) by setting, for x ∈ C, the value βi(x) = κi(x), when
κi(x) ≤ χ, and βi(x) = >, when κi(x) > χ. Assume towards contradiction that η ends
after time |V | · (χ+ 2)|C|. Then, there are 0 ≤ i < j < n such that 〈vi, βi〉 = 〈vj , βj〉. Let
η = η1 · η2 · η3 be a partition of η such that η2 is the sub-path between the i-th and j-th
indices. Consider the path η′ = η′1 · η′3 that is obtained from η by removing the sub-path η2.
First, note that η′ is a legal path. Indeed, the restrictions of the clock valuations in η1 and
η3 match these in η′1 and η′3, that is, η′ = η1 · η3. Second, since we assume that traversing
the loop η2 is not instantaneous, we know that η′ ends before η. Moreover, since the rates in
P are non-negative, we have price(η′) ≤ price(η), and we reach a contradiction to the fact
that η is an optimal timed path that ends earliest. J
I Theorem 14. For a k-player TNG T with a set V of vertices and a set C of clocks, there
exists an SO that ends by time O(|V |k · χk|C|), where χ is the maximum constant appearing
in T . For every k ≥ 1, there is a k-player (cost-sharing and congestion) TNG Tk such that
Tk has O(k) states, the boundaries in the guards in Tk are bounded by O(k log k), and any
SO in Tk requires time 2Ω(k).
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Figure 3 The time required for the SO is not polynomial.
Proof. We start with the upper bound. Consider a TNG T with a set V of vertices and
a set C of clocks. By Theorem 6, we can construct a PTA P with |V |k vertices and k|C|
clocks such that a social optimum of T is an optimal timed path in P . Applying Lemma 13,
we are done.
We turn to the lower bounds. We show that for every k ≥ 1, there is a k-player (cost-
sharing and congestion) TNG Tk such that Tk has O(k) states, the boundaries in the guards
in Tk are bounded by O(k log k), and any SO in Tk requires time 2Ω(k).
Consider the k-player cost-sharing TNG appearing on the left of Figure 3. Let p1, . . . , pk
be relatively prime (e.g., the the first k prime numbers). All the vertices in the TNG have
cost 0, except for v, which has some positive cost function. Each player i has to spend one
time unit in v in her path from si to u. In an SO, all k players spend this one time unit
simultaneously, which forces them all to reach v at time
∏
1≤i≤k pi. Since the i-th prime
number is O(i log i) and the product of the first i prime numbers is 2Ω(i), we are done. We
note that we could define the TNG also with no free vertices, that is vertics with 0 cost, by
setting the cost in v to be much higher than those in the source vertices.
For congestion games, the example is more complicated. We start with the case of two
players. Consider the congestion TNG appearing on the right of Figure 3. Assume that p1
and p2 are relatively prime, rs1(1) = rs2(1) = 0, and rs1(2) = rs2(2) = 1. In the SO, the two
players avoid each other in their paths from si to ui, and the way to do so is to wait p1 · p2
time units before the edge from si to s3−i is traversed. In the full version,we generalize this
example to k players. Again, we could define the TNG with no free vertices. J
We proceed to derive a time bound for the existence of an NE. For a TNG T , let LT ∈ N
be the smallest number such that multiplying the latency functions by LT results in a
normalized TNG. Recall the SO(T ) is the cost of a social optimum in T .
I Theorem 15. Consider a TNG T with k players, played on a timed network 〈V,E,C〉,
and let χ be the maximum constant appearing in a guard. Then, there is an NE in T that
ends by time O(ϕ · |V | · χ|C| + |V |k · χk|C|), where ϕ = LT · SO(T ) for congestion TNGs and
ϕ = LT · log(k) · SO(T ) for cost-sharing TNGs.
Proof. Recall the proof of Theorem 11 that shows that every TNG has an integral NE: we
choose an initial integral profile P and perform integral best-response moves until an NE
is reached. The number of iterations is bounded by the potential Ψ(P ) of P . We start the
best-response sequence from a social-optimum profile O that ends earliest. By Theorem 14,
there is such a profile that ends by time O(|V |k · χk|C|). Let ϕ = LT · SO(T ) in the case of
congestion TNGs and ϕ = LT · (ln(k) + 1) · SO(T ) in the case of cost-sharing TNGs. It is
not hard to show that Ψ(O) ≤ ϕ.
Next, we bound the time that is added in a best-response step. We recall the construction
in Theorem 4 of the PTA P for finding a best-response move. Consider a TNG T and a
profile of strategies P , where, w.l.o.g., we look for a best-response for Player k. Suppose the
strategies of Players 1, . . . , k − 1 take transitions at times τ1, . . . , τn. We construct a PTA P
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with n+ 1 copies of T . For 1 ≤ i ≤ n+ 1, an optimal path in P starts in the first copy and
moves from copy i to copy (i+ 1) at time τi. We use the additional “global” clock to enforce
these transitions. A key observation is that in the last copy, this additional clock is never
used. Thus, the largest constant in a guard in the last copy coincides with χ, the largest
constant appearing in T . Let η be an optimal path in P and pik the corresponding strategy
for Player k. We distinguish between two cases. If η does not enter the last copy of P, then
it ends before time τn, namely the latest time at which a player reaches her destination.
Then, the profile P [k ← pik] ends no later than P . In the second case, the path η ends in the
last copy of P. We view the last copy of P as a PTA. By Lemma 13, the time at which η
ends is within |V | · (χ+ 2)|C| since its entrance into the copy, which is τn. Then, P [i← pik]
ends at most |V | · (χ + 2)|C| time units after P . To conclude, the best-response sequence
terminates in an NE that ends by time O(ϕ · |V | · (χ+ 2)|C| + |V |k · χk|C|). J
7 Discussion and Future Work
The model of TNGs studied in this paper extends the model of GTNGs introduced in [13] by
adding clocks. From a practical point of view, the addition of clocks makes TNGs significantly
more expressive than GTNGs and enables them to model the behavior of many systems that
cannot be modeled using GTNGs. From a theoretical point of view, the analysis of TNGs
poses different and difficult technical challenges. In the case of GTNGs, a main tool for
obtaining positive results is a reduction between GTNGs and NGs. Here, in order to obtain
positive results we need to combine techniques from NGs and PTAs.
We left several open problems. In Theorem 11, we describe a method for finding an
integral NE through a sequence of BR moves. We leave open the complexity of finding an
NE in TNGs. For the upper bound, we conjecture that there is a PSPACE algorithm for the
problem. For the lower bound, we would need to find an appropriate complexity class of
search problems and show hardness for that class. For example, PLS [31], which lies “close”
to P, and includes the problem of finding an NE in NGs, consists of search problems in which
a local search, e.g., a BR sequence, terminates. Unlike NGs, where a BR can be found in
polynomial time, in TNGs, the problem is PSPACE-complete. To the best of our knowledge,
complexity classes for search problems that are higher than PLS were not studied. Further
we show that the BR and SO problems for one-clock TNGs is in PSPACE and is NP-hard,
leaving open the tight complexity.
This work belongs to a line of works that transfer concepts and ideas between the areas
of formal verification and algorithmic game theory: logics for specifying multi-agent systems
[8, 26], studies of equilibria in games related to synthesis and repair problems [25, 24, 33, 3],
and of non-zero-sum games in formal verification [28, 22]. This line of work also includes
efficient reasoning about NGs with huge networks [40, 12], an extension of NGs to objectives
that are richer than reachability [16], and NGs in which the players select their paths
dynamically [15]. For future work, we plan to apply the real-time behavior of TNGs to these
last two concepts; namely, TNGs in which the players’ objectives are given as a specification
that is more general than simple reachability or TNGs in which the players reveal their
choice of timed path in steps, bringing TNGs closer to the timed games of [11, 2].
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